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7 The Effectiveness of Alternative Water Governance Arrangements 
Claude Ménard and Rathinasamy Maria Saleth1 
 
7.1 Introduction 
There is a consensus both in the literature and policy circles that “water crisis is essentially a 
crisis of governance” (Global Water Partnership 2000).  This fact applies equally to both the 
water sector as a whole as well as its main subsectors, i.e. urban water supply and irrigation.  
Given the economic, social, and environmental costs associated with ineffective water 
governance arrangements, there is an urgent need to evaluate the effectiveness of existing 
water governance arrangements and their alternatives.  Such an evaluation requires a clear, 
operationally applicable and commonly understood definition of water governance and its 
alternative forms and their key features and indicators of effectiveness applicable at various 
scales.  Such an operational and analytical understanding can form the basis for evaluating 
alternative water governance arrangements in terms of their ability to meet the efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability goals.  It can also form the basis for the evaluation of ongoing and 
proposed reforms that might improve the effectiveness of water governance in specific 
contexts. 
Given the strong and positive association between effective governance and better 
development outcomes (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999), many countries have 
been trying to improve the effectiveness of water governance through various forms of 
institutional reforms and technical modifications over the past two decades.  Although such 
reforms are neither uniform across countries or across water subsectors, there are certain 
common trends and patterns.  While countries with institutionally advanced water sectors 
are going for high level institutional changes, in other countries, there is a gradual move 
away from state-centric and centralized forms to more user-centric, market-based, and 
inclusive forms of governance.  There is an increasing tendency towards basin-based 
decentralization, better cost recovery, water demand management, and user and private 
sector participation (Saleth and Dinar 2000; Tropp 2007).  The changes brought by reforms 
have changed the governance structure in the water sector in general and water subsectors in 
particular. 
A comparative approach, based on numerous experiences of water governance reforms in 
many different countries (see Shirley (ed.), 2002; Saleth and Dinar 2004, 2005, and 2006), 
suggests that there is no optimal answer to the problems of urban water and irrigation 
governance problems.  There is no particular arrangement that would be effective in all 
contexts.  This is because the success of a specific arrangement, its implementation, and its 
monitoring depends on its relationship with the suite of institutional arrangements within 
which it sits.  At a general level, this means that there is the need for a collection of 
polycentric governance systems to meet the goals of efficiency and equity in different 
contexts.  As a result, and this is what we commonly observe most of the time, we have a 
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mix of systems.  This raises a difficult problem for decision makers because selecting 
effective governance requires identifying its feasibility, which depends on different 
considerations including the efficiency, equity, and sustainability dimensions in specific 
circumstances. 
This chapter aims to provide some answers using both theoretical considerations as well as 
practical illustrations at the sub sectoral levels of urban water supply and irrigation as well 
as at the water sector as a whole.  It examines different possibilities to deal with governance 
issues appropriately using several criteria, particularly feasibility, performance efficiency, 
transparency of the process, and accountability of decision makers.  It also derives certain 
guidelines and principles that can be used to enhance the effectiveness of water governance 
in sub sectoral and the general water sector context.  The chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 7.2 discusses the concept and analytics of water governance.  Section 7.3 examines 
alternative modes of organization that can be implemented in urban and/or rural water 
supply and in irrigation.  Section 7.4 refers to past and ongoing reforms to review 
requirements and trends in changes in water governance.  Section 0 summarizes lessons 
drawn from general governance considerations with regard to the effectiveness of utilities 
generally and the water sector as a whole more specifically.  Section 0 identifies principles 
and proposes guidelines for accompanying reforms motivated by the search for more 
effective arrangements.  Section 7.7 concludes with some recommendations to 
policymakers. 
 
7.2 Water governance: concept and framework 
Like the general concept of governance, the concept of water governance also has different 
definitions.  While Franks (2004) discusses the historical evolution of the concept of water 
governance, Rogers and Hall (2003) and Tropp (2007) have provided a review of different 
definitions of governance in general and water governance in particular.  The Global Water 
Partnership (2002) defines water governance as the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the 
delivery of water services, at different levels of society. 
According to Rogers and Hall (2003), the concept of water governance,  
“encompasses laws, regulations, and institutions but it also relates to government 
policies and actions, to domestic activities, and to networks of influence, including 
international market forces, the private sector and civil society.  These in turn are 
affected by the political systems within which they function.  National sovereignty, 
social values or political ideology may have a strong impact on attempts to change 
governance arrangements related to the water sector, as is the case for example, with 
land and water rights or corruption.”   
This looks to be a very general definition of water governance but, from an institutional 
economics perspective, it sheds light on the two analytical dimensions of governance: 
“governance framework or environment” and “governance structure”, including their main 
institutional components (North 1990; Saleth and Dinar 2004)  
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Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 summarize relationships between the environment and water 
governance (Saleth and Dinar 2004 and 2005).  From the perspective of water, the 
governance environment covers the elements of the general governance system in the 
country, including the constitution, political arrangements, resources potential, development 
stage and population among other considerations.  In the water sector, institutional 
performance is affected by the interaction of all these arrangements.  The interaction process 
is influenced by factors that are both exogenous and endogenous to the water sector and its 
institutional arrangements.  A change in any of these factors can, therefore, affect not only 
the process of institutional change but also the performance of the water sector.  The 
governance structure, on the other hand, captures the institutional basis of water governance 
and covers essentially the water-related legal, policy, and organizational elements (Ostrom 
1990; Saleth and Dinar 2004) 
 
Figure 7.1 Arrangements influencing institutional performance in the water sector  
Source: Saleth and Dinar (2004). 
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Figure 7.2 Water governance structure 
Source: Saleth and Dinar (2004). 
To see these elements, one can follow the following unbundling exercise.  Initially, water 
governance structure is unbundled to identify its three main components - water law, water 
policy, and water organization.  Then each of these components is unbundled further to 
identify the key institutional aspects (see Figure 7.1).  The main advantage of this exercise is 
that it is possible to trace the structural and functional linkages evident both within and 
across institutional components. 
Figure 7.1 indicates the embedded nature of water governance within the overall socio-
economic, political, and resource context.  In other words, water governance system 
functions within the general governance system of the country, indicating also the sources 
from which reform pressures can originate.  While Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 deal with water 
governance at the overall sectoral level, water governance systems can also be identified in 
different sectoral and spatial contexts.  They will have unique characteristics depending on 
whether the water is required for drinking, irrigation or other purposes and whether or not 
the scale involves local urban, rural, national, basin, region, watershed or city use.  But, 
these context specific governance arrangements are hierarchically or vertically intersecting 
due to inter sectoral and inter regional water dependence.  Thus, the nature of the alternative 
governance arrangements and their effectiveness depend clearly on the context or the unit of 
analysis (Ostrom 1990).  There is also an important issue of the governance scale and forms 
(Huitema and Bressers 2007; Tropp 2007).  While evaluating the effectiveness of alternative 
governance arrangements, there is a need for a distinction between governance forms in 
terms of centralized versus decentralized, single state actor versus  multiple actors and 
stakeholders, top-down versus  bottom-up, and bureaucratic versus  market-centric.  
Connected with this, especially in the context of decentralized governance, is the issue of 
“poly-centric” and “distributed” governance (Kooiman 1993; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; 
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Ostrom and others 1999), where there are parallel but related governance arrangements 
functioning side-by-side in different levels and contexts. 
There are at least, three different dimensions or levels of governance that need to be aligned.  
At the physical and/or technical level, the set of feasible solutions is already restricted by 
different constraints that need to be taken into account including the geology of the region, 
its hydrogeology, the density of population and its distribution over the relevant territory, 
the existence (or not) of urban planning, the characteristics of the existing water network, 
and so forth.  At the organizational level, the choice of a specific arrangement is also 
conditional on several factors including the existence of expertise among local or regional 
authorities, the availability of adequate financial resources, the possibility of private sector 
participation which in turn depends on the status of financial markets and the risks at stake; 
and, last but not least, the existence and availability of competent management.  At the 
institutional level, the combination of policy making and the political process that provides 
its backbone, which in water systems always involves local and regional authorities, and of 
the existence of more or less efficient dispute resolution mechanisms (including courts), also 
condition the type of arrangement that will be feasible.  Three major consequences result 
from this complexity.  First, because of the diversity of situations at these three levels, we 
necessarily need a poly-centric approach that can meet this diversity, an issue of particular 
significance in water systems that differentiates it from other infrastructures, e.g. electricity 
or telecommunications.  Second, a key issue for the implementation of successful 
governance as a whole is that the feasibility of a solution and its success will depend on its 
capacity to appropriately align the three levels of governance identified above.  Third, 
reforming and monitoring water governance is necessarily a team exercise involving 
different experts, policymakers and concerned populations.  In that respect, the capacity to 
build consensus is a decisive aspect of effective governance. 
How does one evaluate the effectiveness of governance arrangements?  This issue can be 
addressed both from a qualitative and quantitative perspective.  The indicators of effective 
governess suggested by Rogers and Hall (2003) capture essentially the desirable features of 
effective governance such as: (a) transparency, (b) accountability, (c) participatory, (d) 
communicative, (e) integrative, (f) efficiency, (g) incentive-compatibility, (h) sustainability, 
and (i) equity.  One can also add feasibility and replicability, given the technical, social, and 
information conditions present in many developing countries.  Although some of these 
features can be assessed quantitatively in a specific context (e.g., efficiency and equity), 
others can be evaluated largely from a qualitative perspective.  But, the effectiveness of 
particular elements of governance (legal, policy, and organizational aspects) can be 
evaluated more closely using specific economic and technical variables such as those based 
on pricing, cost recovery, use efficiency, conflict reduction, supply adequacy and coverage, 
and the reduction of unaccounted for water.  The variable-based indicators are particularly 
effective in evaluating water governance at the regional and sub sectoral levels.   While 
evaluating different water governance arrangements in this paper, both the quantitative 
indicators as well as qualitative features that are listed above will be used. 
7 
 
7.3 Alternative water governance systems 
Different forms of governance are available for managing water in urban water supply and 
irrigation sectors.  They are easier to identify and evaluate for their performance in specific 
sectors and contexts.  Although they are treated as alternatives in specific context, from a 
general perspective, they are complementary in the sense that they can operate side-by-side 
to meet the specific sectoral and regional water requirements.  This is illustrated in this 
section in the specific contexts of water supply and irrigation sectors.   
7.3.1 Water governance arrangements in urban supply 
There is a variety of possible arrangements for providing drinkable water in an urban 
environment.  The main arrangements are now relatively well known and have been 
implemented in many different environments.  They can be identified through the allocation 
of property rights (and the associated decision rights) and the allocation of risks (and the 
associated incentives) (see Figure 7.3). 
 
     Public operation      Private Sector Participation                  Private 
                                                                                                                             owner 
 
-----/-----------/-----------------/--------------/---------------/----------------/---------------/--- 
      public public         service      management       lease     concession    private 
     bureau corporation  contract    contact       company            
 
Figure 7.3 Allocation of rights that defines different institutional arrangements for the supply of 
water 
Source: Ménard (2009). 
At one extreme the water entity providing water is government owned and operated, either 
as a bureau or agency that is part of a ministry, or as a publicly owned corporation 
operating with greater autonomy.  At the other extreme, the water entity is sold and the 
provision of water services controlled by a private firm that is usually highly regulated.  
Between these polar cases we find a whole range of public-private arrangements, based on 
contracts in which property rights and or decision rights are shared and risks more or less 
supported by one party (most of the time public authorities as a last resort).   
Service contracts are cases where a private firm is paid for delivering specific 
services in response to a purchase order, e.g. fixing leaks or collecting bills.  The 
private operator carries almost no risk, beside default of payment from public 
authorities. 
Management contracts transfer some decision rights to a private operator, who has 
on-going responsibility for managing most or all daily operations, usually for a 
management fee.  However, property rights and risks remain with the authority.   
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Lease contracts give the private operator full responsibility for management and 
maintenance. The Government is in charge of major investments and the operator is 
usually paid in part or entirely from the profits of the company. 
Concessions, often identified as the “French model,” are contracts that transfer 
investment, maintenance decisions and risks as well as management to a private 
operator for a relatively long period of time, where the operator is in principle2 paid 
entirely from profits.   
Choosing the right duck for the right pond remains a controversial issue.  Recent reforms in 
urban water systems have been motivated mainly by two different, although often 
complementary, goals.  First, to reduce the gap between supply and demand which remains 
a major issue for a substantial part of the world population and raises problems of 
effectiveness as well as of equity.  Second, to reach that goal efficiently in a context of 
increasing environmental and financial constraints.   
Three main solutions, each one with its own problems, seem to prevail in developed as well 
as developing countries.  First, there has been a shift from bureaus to corporatization for 
those water utilities that remain under full public control.  Corporatization gives autonomy 
to decision-makers, essentially the management and the capacity to control investment 
cycles without being entirely captured by political cycles.  However public corporations are 
often faced with incentive problems and remain at risk of political interference.  Second, full 
privatization has been implemented in some countries, although this solution is uncommon 
due to the political sensitivity associated with the use of markets to manage water.  
Specification of water rights to the degree necessary to enable the use of market 
mechanisms to manage water is difficult.  Nevertheless, it is being tried with varying 
degrees of success in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
Chile.3  Third, private sector participation became highly fashionable in the reform of water 
sector in the 1990s, mainly through management or lease contracts, with mixed results 
(Gassner, Popov and Pushak 2009).  Some problems that have plagued these solutions relate 
to the risk of political opportunism and the reluctance of private operators to support 
financial risks associated with the long term investments that prevail in the urban water 
sector.  Others include the difficulties of adequate regulation.  Public authorities frequently 
find themselves squeezed between operators and users when fixing and regulating water 
prices and they must also balance the need to control operators efficiently without undue 
interference. 
A controversial alternative that has existed in rural areas for a long time and has surfaced in 
some large cities recently, is the concept of a local self-sustained system.  Self sustained 
systems rely on collective actions for example when inhabitants of a neighbourhood 
                                                 
2
 There might be subsidies, for example, to allow low income population to benefit from connection to 
the system. 
3
 Competition in the market remains extremely limited so far.  See recent and difficult effort in the UK 
to develop common carriage, cross-border supply, and competition on vertical supply.  In developing 
countries, privately delivering water by trucks introduces some competition in the market … at very high 
costs. 
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organize themselves to pump and deliver water from an underground reservoir.  However, 
these solutions have limited capacities to provide drinkable water in large cities and raise 
important environmental problems.  Table 7.1 summarizes some characteristics and 
problems of these leading organizational arrangements. 
Table 7.1 Urban water governance: Characteristics and problems of major arrangements 
 
Particulars Public 
Corporation 
Management 
contract 
Lease contract Privatization 
Property 
Rights 
Public Public Infrastructure: 
public 
Equipment: Private 
Private 
Autonomy of 
decision rights 
Partial (Political 
control in last 
resort) 
Limited.  Strategic 
decisions remain in 
public hands 
Extended, but also 
dependent on 
decisions of public 
authorities 
In theory: total. 
But: highly regulated 
Risk sharing None: public None: public Very limited for 
lessee 
Total (but can be 
limited by contractual 
clauses) 
Incentives Weak Weak (cost plus 
system) 
Intermediate Strong 
Mode of 
Regulation 
Command-and-
control 
Combination of 
public bureau and 
contract 
Through contracts Regulatory agency or 
competition laws 
Political 
interferences 
Significant Significant Mostly on strategic 
decisions (through 
control over major 
investments) 
In principle: none 
In practice: through 
regulator 
7.3.2   Water governance arrangements in the irrigation sector 
The alternative water governance arrangements in the urban sector are distinguished and 
evaluated in terms of the different forms of public and private roles in asset ownership, 
operational management, and contractual arrangements, regulations and mutual 
responsibilities.  Similar principles apply to an even greater extent in the irrigation 
subsector.  For instance, irrigation governance arrangements can be differentiated in terms 
of their water property right regime such as open access, common property, private 
property, and state property (Rogers and Hall 2003).  From an organizational perspective, 
since irrigation governance systems vary in terms of their key features and coverage, they 
can also be differentiated in terms of their regional structure such as those based on basins, 
projects and administrative regions as well as their focus such as those based on quantity 
and quality and, also, whether or not they are surface water and groundwater based.  Since 
the irrigation sector is spatially vast and physically diverse, all these forms of governance 
can co-exist and be designed to fit different regional, agronomic and socio-economic 
requirements.  From a governance perspective, they can also be classified as ‘hierarchical’, 
‘poly-centric’, ‘distributed’, and ‘market-centric’ (Kooiman 1993; Keohane and 
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Ostrom 1995; Ostrom and others 1999; Roger and Hall 2003).  There are also some new 
forms of governance arrangements such as those which involve irrigation companies (as in 
Australia, and the United States of America) as well as those based on the formation of 
irrigation water development corporations as is being trialled in India (see Box 7.1).   
 
Box 7.1: Emergence of water corporations in India 
The creation of autonomous water corporations in several Indian states represents a new development in 
irrigation water governance. 
These corporations aim to mobilize private funds through water bonds for development irrigation projects.  For 
instance, Karnataka has formed the Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Limited (KBJNL) in 1994 under the 
Companies Act.  With a high return (about 17.5 percent) and government guarantee, the water bonds issued by 
KBJNL fetched an unexpected sum of Rs. 23 billion (1$=46.8 Rs) during 1995-99.  Similarly, the Maharashtra 
Krishna Valley Development Corporation (MKVDC) floated by Maharashtra in 1996 mobilized Rs. 4.28 
billion as against the target of only Rs. 1.5 billion for 1996. 
As these corporations are expected to run on commercial principle, they are likely to enhance the financial 
viability and productivity of the irrigation sector.  As these are public corporations, they are also likely to 
improve accountability and transparency in irrigation management. 
Source: Saleth (2004). 
 
Despite the diversity in their features and functional roles, the main forms of water 
governance that are observed in the irrigation sector can be broadly identified as no 
governance (open access), centralized bureaucratic systems, market or negotiation driven 
systems, and community and user-based arrangements (common pool resources).  From a 
spatial perspective, these arrangements are also operating at different spatial scales such as 
basin, watershed and administrative regions.  Although some forms of governance 
arrangements can be alternative (e.g. bureaucratic and market-based), in many contexts they 
can also be complementary in the sense that even within a centralized and bureaucratic 
system, user groups and market-based water allocation can operate.  Obviously, a 
centralized system is better as it reduces the anarchy in resource use associated with the 
open access condition in terms of criteria such as efficiency and equity.  However, when 
compared to a decentralized user-based or market-oriented system, a centralized system 
cannot be considered effective because it fails to meet the desirable features of efficiency, 
accountability, transparency, and participation.  Then again, a market-based system, 
although efficient and transparent, may not be able to meet the equity and sustainability 
criteria which often requires some form of social control through some type of regulation.  
Similarly, decentralized arrangements are effective in terms of transparency and 
participation, from the view of the planning and coordination requirement of the goal of 
integrated water resource management but may not be that effective, unless they are 
functioning within an overall framework of centralized coordination.  Community-based 
governance arrangements, although effective in addressing equity, participatory, and 
sustainability requirements, in view of a high degree of their context-specificity, can be 
difficult to upscale or replicate. 
There is a rich body of knowledge on the nature and features of water governance 
arrangements in the irrigation sector in a wide variety of countries around the world (Maass 
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and Anderson 1978; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and others 1999; 
Saleth and Dinar 2000 and 2004).  Broadly speaking, water rights centred and market-
oriented governance arrangements are common in irrigation water management countries 
such as US, Australia, Chile, and Mexico.  Similarly, community based governance 
arrangements exist in many developing countries such as India, Nepal, and Bangladesh as 
well as some countries in Africa. 
In India, for instance, while community based governance arrangements were the dominant 
form in the pre-colonial era, with the development of large scale irrigation projects during 
the British period, they have been sidelined or replaced by centralized bureaucratic 
governance.  Today, they are confined to few pockets, especially in fragile resource regions.  
This is also true of most British colonies in Asia and Africa as well.  As a result, the 
dominant form of irrigation governance in most developing countries is centralized 
governance, with state playing the major role in water development, allocation, and 
management.  However, with the promotion of irrigation management transfer (IMT) to 
outlet and system level water user associations and with the advent of the pump 
technologies, there has been some dilution in the centralized system.  This dilution has not 
been uniform across developing countries and the extent of it depends on the degree of 
success of the IMT program.  It has been quite effective in Mexico (see Box 7.2) and 
relatively successful in countries including Columbia, Turkey, Philippines, Indonesia, and 
India (Vermillion 1997).  As far as the governance of groundwater irrigation, most countries 
lack any systematic governance arrangements, leading to anarchy in groundwater 
withdrawal and use.  Although there has not been any formal and lawful water rights 
system, de facto rights within the open access system and groundwater markets have 
emerged, as observed widely in several countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and 
Bangladesh.  A review of groundwater markets in India, for instance, suggests that they are 
quite effective in promoting efficiency in water use as well as equity in the access to water 
by small farmers (Saleth 2004). 
 
Box 7.2: Irrigation management transfer in Mexico 
The main plank irrigation reform in Mexico was the transfer of irrigation management to farmer associations.  
This program covered almost all irrigation schemes in the country.  The evaluation of the program suggests 
that the outcomes were positive on all counts.  As compared to the pre-reform period (1988), water fees paid 
by water users rose from 18 to 80 percent of the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs.  The efficiency of 
water distribution rose from 8 to 65 percent.  Along with a general reduction in O&M costs, there has also 
been a 50 percent reduction in the size of irrigation bureaucracy.  A farmers’ survey suggests that 80 percent of 
the respondent reported that the reform had improved water management.  Although there are still financial 
difficulties and scarcity issues, the transfer from a centralized and state-operated system to water users has 
certainly improved irrigation and yield performance in Mexico. 
 
The centralized bureaucratic arrangements observed in many developing countries are 
gradually evolving to accommodate user participation and market role as well as community 
decision-making within the irrigation sector.  Considering the vast and diverse nature of the 
irrigation sector with millions of small farmers observed in many developing countries, the 
sudden introduction of governance arrangements centred on water rights and market-based 
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transaction may not be that easy.  As the irrigation sector matures, such governance 
arrangements are expected to evolve, especially in areas with advanced and commercialized 
agriculture.  Such an evolution is expected to be faster in countries such as China, Mexico, 
Chile, Spain, and South Africa but would be slower in countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka (Saleth and Dinar 2000).  While different forms of irrigation governance have 
their own advantages and defects in terms of the desirable criteria of effective governance, 
in many contexts these forms are complimentary and can meet the requirements of different 
regional contexts.  Although one cannot be dogmatic about the appropriateness of different 
governance arrangements, especially in the irrigation sector, it is still necessary to ensure 
some universally acceptable attributes of effective governance (Roger and Hall 2003). 
 
7.4 Reforming water governance arrangements  
For establishing more effective water governance, there is a critical need to create an 
enabling environment that can promote public and private sector involvement and wider 
stakeholder participation (Rogers and Hall 2003).  The creation of an enabling environment 
requires various forms of reforms in the water institutional structure that provide the 
operational form for water governance in different contexts.  The choice between the 
different possible arrangements described above is determined not so much by the search for 
the best feasible solution as by forces pushing towards changes in governance.  In most 
cases, it is a combination of macroeconomic tensions, particularly in public finance, and 
subsector problems, which are distinct in irrigation and in drinkable urban water, that 
triggers the search for more effective governance.  In that respect, environmental issues 
entered into the picture quite recently and permeate the debate about water governance very 
slowly. 
7.4.1   Governance reforms in urban water: requirements and trends 
In what follows, we discuss the nature and role of the main forces at work and their 
respective weight in engaging changes in the governance of water systems.  Figure 7.4   
depicts the factors that motivate reforms in urban water governance.  The balance of these 
forces determine expectations with respect to: (a) accessibility, both in terms of connection 
and continuity of services; (b) affordability, which depends on pricing and its capacity to 
either provide enough resources to make adequate investments or to provide sufficient 
guarantee to borrow from financial markets; (c) safety, which relates to the continuity and 
quality of water delivered; and (d) sustainability, which concerns externalities in the short 
term (e.g., damages to the road system due to leakages or flood resulting from poor 
maintenance or insufficient investments) and the capacity to maintain the resource (and its 
quality) in the long term.   
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Figure 7.4  Forces pushing towards reforms in urban governance 
Source: Ménard (2009). 
Because of their very nature, which is that water systems are local or regional, potential 
benefits of a reform in the governance of water are quite modest for national politicians.  
Hence, what might change political preferences? With the exception of rivers that raise 
geopolitical issues (e.g., the Jordan or the Nile), pressures are mostly on local and regional 
politicians and reach higher levels of government largely through their influence.  
Therefore, it is primarily at that level that pressures for change come, or should be put.  
Unsatisfied demand and service problems play a major role in that respect since reforms 
implemented to increase both efficiency and effectiveness create a significant pool of 
beneficiaries.  Environmental issues are also increasingly part of unsatisfied demand.  The 
main indicators signalling problems include:  
(1) Low rates of connection for households in urban water and/or limited availability for 
households (e.g. only a few hours per day) or farmers. 
(2) Unaccounted for Water so that only part of the water produced reaches users, which 
has a negative impact on availability, prices, and quality (leaks can be a source of 
pollution). 
(3) Pricing, since the demand for water is quite inelastic; this makes users, and above all 
the poorest segment of the population, very sensitive to price issues.  It should be 
noted that very often this difficulty is bypassed by plunging water bill into the 
general bill for local services, which generates lack of transparency and reduces 
accountability for the operators, whether public or private. 
(4) Related to prices, cost coverage is also an issue since it determines investments as 
well as return on investments, therefore determining the sustainability (and quality) 
of effective water systems in the long run. 
However, part of these sector problems can be hidden if local and or central governments 
have soft budget constraints, so that they can, for example, subsidize the systems or 
maintain overstaffing.  This explains why most changes in governance happen at times of 
hard budget constraints generated by:  
1. Growing public deficits;  
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2. Accumulated public debt that makes recourses to debt or equity very costly or even 
hazardous; and 
3. Inflation that can cause costs to rise quickly and outpace opportunities to increase 
water charges.   
Finally, the combination of sector problems and macroeconomic tensions need to be 
transformed into policy-making oriented towards more effective governance.  This is the 
political economy of water.  If we simplify an issue that is quite complex, we can argue that:  
1. Substantial changes in water governance happen when there is a regime change or 
coalition shift that brings to power a governing group perceiving net political 
benefits from reform.  Potential winners must exceed losers. 
2. Since water is rarely a top priority on the long term agenda of politicians, the 
window opening for reforms is usually relatively short and comes immediately after 
political change happens, or, alternatively, right before an election in which 
constituencies concerned by water issues become an important target. 
A comparative study of reforms in several major cities in Africa and Latin America 
illustrates the weight of these factors and how they push with varying intensity towards 
reform of water utilities.  This is shown in Figure 7.2. 
Taking into account the powerful forces pushing for changes in water systems, a striking 
fact at the empirical level is the slow rate of reforms in water governance and the ambiguous 
results.  In an extensive review of urban water and sanitation systems that prevail in 
developing countries4, Gassner and others (2009) identified a sample of 977 utilities. 
                                                 
4
 The sample covers 71 countries, spanning the years from 1973 to 2005.  Most of the data are actually 
concentrated in 1992-2004 
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Table 7.2: Combination of factors motivating urban government reform 
 
Particulars Buenos 
Aires 
Lima Mexico-DF Santiago Abidjan Conakry 
Sector Crisis:  
  Not connected 
  Service 
 
30% 
poor 
 
 
25% 
very poor 
 
3% 
poor in some 
areas 
 
1% 
relatively good 
 
40% 
relatively 
good 
 
60%+ 
very poor 
Macro 
conditions: 
  Inflation 
  Deficit/GDP 
  Public debt/GDP 
 
 
2,314% 
0.4% 
25% 
 
 
3,393% 
5.2% 
152%c 
 
 
27% 
2.5% 
46% 
 
 
19% 
0.9% 
56%d 
 
 
2% 
0.2% 
lowe 
 
 
37% 
3.5%f 
highg 
Political Change 
 
 
Regime 
change 
 
Regime 
change 
 
Coalition 
shift 
 
Change earlier 
 
Increased 
opposition. 
 
Regime 
change 
Nature of change 
in governance 
Shift to PSP 
(concession) 
Failed 
attempt at 
PSP 
DF split in 
distinct 
areas, with 
limited PSP 
in each 
Corporatisation 
(relatively 
minor changes 
at the time) 
Renewal of 
concession 
(with 
relatively 
minor 
changes 
From public 
entity to 
introduction 
of PSP 
(leasing in 
distribution) 
Notes: aNational annual averages for third year before reform.  bEnd of year, 1990=100.  cTwo years before.  
dOne year before.  eNo data, but sources describe it as low.  fOne year after reform; Guinea was in fiscal crisis 
in period before reform.  gNo data, but sources describe it as very high.   
Source: Adapted from Menard and Shirley (2002).   
 
Most of them (85 per cent) maintained a state-owned enterprise, the main change being in 
corporatization of the utility, while the adoption of arrangements involving Private Sector 
Participation (PSP) remained limited in percentage (15 per cent) as well as geographically 
(67 per cent of the PSP were in Latin America and the Caribbean, and actually mostly 
concentrated on a very small number of cases), with significant fluctuations over time.  The 
market share of PSP in developing and emerging countries increased from about one per 
cent in 1997 to seven per cent in 2007 but still remains low since PSP supplies only about 
160 million people in these countries (Marin 2009).  According to the PPI database, there 
was a peak at the end of the 1990s, followed by an abrupt decline, a new trend upward 
between 2003 and 2005 and again a decline.5 Even more disturbing are the ambiguous 
results of these changes along the criteria identified above, particularly when it comes to 
                                                 
5
  See http://ppi.worldbank.org/ (note 23 from June 2009) and Marin (2009), p.  24 
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PSP.6 According to Perard (2009), who reviewed systematically 27 econometric studies 
covering up to hundreds of water utilities, 8 of them concluded that private operators were 
more efficient than public ones. Of the others, 16 found no substantial difference in 
efficiency and three concluded there were some advantages on the side of public entities.  
This is in line with studies on developed countries (see Ménard and Saussier 2002; Wallsten 
and Kosec 2008). 
7.4.2 Governance reforms in the irigation sector: requirements and trends 
Countries are increasingly recognizing the importance and urgency of reorientating their 
irrigation governance arrangements in line with the emerging realities and requirements of 
their irrigation sector.  Despite the political challenges and practical difficulties, many 
countries have indeed undertaken significant reforms in an effort to create irrigation 
governance arrangements that will be more responsive to their current and future economic 
and environmental requirements.  These reform initiatives are visible both at macro level 
(e.g. declaration of water laws and water policies, preparation of national and regional water 
plans, and administrative reorganizations) and at the micro level (e.g. IMT, corporatization 
and private sector participation, revision of irrigation water pricing, and the spontaneous 
emergence of water markets as well as rental markets for irrigation wells and pump sets).  
Specific reforms observed in many countries include the creation of basin organizations, 
promotion of user organizations, and management decentralization to promote stakeholder 
and/or user participation, privatization of urban and irrigation water supplies, establishment 
of water rights system, promotion of inter and intra-sectoral water markets, reorientation of 
water prices, and water quality regulations (Saleth and Dinar 2000 and 2006). 
Governance reforms are motivated both by factors that are endogenous from the water 
sector as well as those that are exogenous from the water sector (Saleth and Dinar 2004).  
The endogenous factors include water scarcity, water conflicts, financial crisis, drought, 
floods and water quality problems.  The exogenous factors, which relate mainly to aspects 
defining water governance environment (see Figure 7.1), include macro economic crisis, 
political reforms, international agreement, and pressures from donors and or aid agencies.  It 
is also important to note that although there can be sector-specific factors, most factors 
triggering governance reforms in the irrigation sector are more or less the same as those that 
lead to reforms in the water sector as a whole.  The configuration and relative importance of 
the major factors behind the reforms in six countries are shown in Table 7.3.  While the 
factors are identified with a diagnostic use of the transaction cost framework, their relative 
importance is established through subjective evaluation.  Although water scarcity and 
conflicts remain the underlying force for reforms in all the sample countries, there is 
variation in the factors that trigger reform.  For instance, in Australia, the first reform trigger 
came from recognition of a need to make the Australian economy as a whole more 
competitive.  The second involved recognition of the need to resolve tensions between 
irrigators who wanted access to more water and environmentalists concerned about the 
                                                 
6
  Gassner and others (2009, pp.4-5) concludes that PSP resulted in gains in labour productivity (due to 
relatively small reduction in staffs), with no clear investment gains, no significant changes in prices, and 
mixed efficiency gains. 
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declining health of several river systems.  The need to impose water restriction on residents 
in all major southern and eastern cities acted as a third trigger and made dramatic water 
reform possible.  The dominant trigger for water reform in Mexico was economic crisis.  In 
Chile and South Africa, dramatic political change provided the necessary trigger for water 
sector reforms.  In Morocco, the main trigger behind reforms was physical scarcity of water 
due to a near-exhaustion of freshwater.  In Sri Lanka, the major stimulus for reform came 
from the macro economic crisis of 1983 that occurred during successive droughts 
between 1980-85.  Water institutional reforms in Namibia resulted from the economic and 
political reorganization that has occurred since the country’s independence in 1990 (see 
Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3 Configuration and role of factors behind water institutional reforms 
 
Particulars Australia Chile Morocco Namibia South Africa Sri Lanka 
Water scarcity/conflicts ** * ** ** ** * 
Financial crisis * ** ** *** * *** 
Draughts/salinity *** - *** * ** - 
Macro economic reforms *** ** *** - - *** 
Political reforms - *** - *** *** * 
Social issues * - * ** ** - 
Donor pressures - * ** * - *** 
Internal/External agreements *** - - * * - 
Institutional synergy/pressures ** *** * * * * 
Note: The number of *s signifies the relative importance of the factors in the context of each country.  ‘-“ 
means the aspect in question is ‘not applicable’ or ‘not evaluated’.   
Source: Saleth and Dinar (2000)  
Despite country-specific differences in the extent and intensity of reforms in irrigation 
governance, there are certain commonalities as to the central focus and trends in these 
reform initiatives.  The change in the thrust and focus of reforms are changing the old forms 
of water governance into new forms with certain distinguishable characteristics (see Box 
7.3).  Based on a cross-country review and comparison of the governance reform initiatives 
in 43 countries and regions around the world, Saleth and Dinar (2004) have identified five 
common aspects of the ongoing reform initiatives at the international level. 
First, there has been a paradigmatic shift from water development to water allocation with 
the concurrent reorientation of water governance structure.  Second, concurrent with an 
increasing focus on water allocation, there has been a definite shift from engineering 
approach and supply side management to economic approach and demand side 
management.  Third, the trend towards decentralization is also strong, although it occurs 
through a variety of routes including the creation of various forms of basin organizations 
(e.g. watershed committees in Brazil, water conservancy commissions in China, basin 
councils in Mexico, and hydro-geological federations in Spain), as well as the promotion of 
IMT and the development of irrigation privatization.  Fourth, there has also been an 
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increasing commitment to an integrated approach to irrigation management necessary to use 
water from both surface and sub-surface resources as well as the efficient use of water in 
rainfed regions.  Fifth, there is unanimity among countries that a phased improvement in 
cost recovery is the first step to salvage the water sector from both financial crisis and 
physical degeneration.  While better financial health can facilitate the physical health of 
water distribution and drainage infrastructures, the physical sustainability of water sector 
cannot be ensured without controlling the pollution and water quality problems.  The 
common approach in this respect involves water quality grading, quality standards and 
pollution control regulations. 
 
Box 7.3: Water governance: old and new forms 
 
• Government and bureaucracy to civil society and markets 
• Centralized power to diversity of actors and diffused power 
• Hierarchical control to horizontally shared control 
• State enforced rules and regulations to inter-organisational relations and coordination  
• Centralized/top-down to decentralisation/bottom-up governance 
• Formal institutions to informal institutions (network or distributed governance) 
• Bureaucratic allocation to voluntary exchange, self-governance, and market mechanisms.   
• Unilateral and centralized decision to dialogue and partnership as well as participation and negotiation. 
Source: Tropp (2007: Table 1). 
 
The general thrust of water reforms suggest that while they are certainly very positive from 
a long-term historical perspective, they are still far from adequate in meeting the  efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability requirements of the irrigation sector in many developing countries.  
Many reforms amount to empty promises that take the form of declared policies that are not 
implemented or nominal increases in water charges that have very little real value or 
cosmetic changes such as new names for existing organizations.  Substantive reforms such 
as the enactment of new water laws, conversion to a volumetric allocation system, the 
establishment of a new water rights system or the reorganization of a water administration 
system is much rarer.  Too often significant initiatives are undertaken tentatively more as a 
crisis-response than as part of any comprehensive reform package (Saleth and Dinar 2006).  
As a result, there have been considerable variations in the effectiveness of governance 
arrangements both within the irrigation sector as well as in the water sector as whole. 
Globally and as scarcity problems emerge with increasing intensity, there is recognition of 
the benefits of moving to volumetric allocations systems.  Some countries (e.g. Australia 
and Chile as well as regions like California and Colorado in the United States of America) 
already have the capability to implement the allocation paradigm.  Others (e.g. Spain, 
Mexico, Chile, South Africa, Brazil, and China) are moving quickly to develop the 
institutional potential necessary for effective governance whereas the remaining countries 
(e.g. India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) have a long way to go before being in a position to 
create the necessary institutions for efficient water allocation and demand management. 
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7.5 Governance of the water sector as a whole: issues and effectiveness 
Just as water sector governance is embedded within the overall governance arrangements in 
a country, those at the sub sectoral levels are also embedded within overall water 
governance.  In this sense, the effectiveness of the governance arrangements at the sub 
sectoral level depends critically on the effectiveness of governance systems at the water 
sector level as a whole.  The sector level governance issues that are important to address 
relate to the overall planning and management of the resources, meeting environmental 
water needs, water quality and related environmental pollution, and inter-sectoral water 
allocation and conflict resolution.  Obviously, these issues are closely related to the 
implementation of integrated water resource management (IWRM) principles.  In fact, the 
sector level governance provides the institutional context within which IWRM principles are 
operationalized (Rogers and Hall 2003). 
Sector level governance arrangements include water law, water policy and water 
organization involved in the overall planning and management of the resource.  As in the 
case of sub sectoral governance arrangements, the macro or sector level governance also has 
alternative forms.  These macro level arrangements in countries such as Australia, US, 
Mexico, or Chile are confined to overall water planning and management, leaving most of 
the allocation decisions to the basin level bodies and market-based arrangements.  Such a 
division of the sphere of influence between the state, private users, and water companies is 
possible due to the existence of well-developed volumetric water rights systems.  The water 
rights system also enables market or negotiation-based water allocation across sectors and 
regions with minimum conflict.  Although it is commonly held that market-based 
governance arrangements are weak in addressing environmental problems, the experience of 
Australia shows that there are possibilities to explore in that direction (see Box 7.4 ).  In 
other countries such as India, Pakistan and China, the state-centred governance 
arrangements provide scope for the role of private groups and stakeholders, especially at the 
local level involved in water development, allocation, and management within a centralized 
organizational structure.  Since volumetric water rights are weak in these countries, sectoral 
allocation (including the allocation for environment) has to be performed through 
bureaucratic means with very little stakeholder involvement.  Lack of individual and 
sectoral water rights and entitlements also leads to sectoral and regional water conflicts.  
Such conflicts are resolved through centralized non-market mechanisms such as arbitration 
by central government or other state-based technical agencies, tribunals, courts, and water 
resource courts as in South Africa and Spain for instance. 
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Box 7.4: Meeting environmental needs: experience of Australia 
 
Australia was able to start bringing over allocation problems under control by placing a cap or limit on the 
amount of water that could be diverted from the Murray Darling Basin in 1993-94.  This was followed by the 
development of a salinity trading scheme designed to force states to offset the salinity impacts of any new 
development and address a legacy of existing salinity management problems.  As pressures for water reform 
grew and public pressure for change mounted Australian governments have started buying back water for the 
environment and have agreed to transfer planning responsibility from states to an independent Murray Darling 
Basin Authority established under Federal legislation. Amongst other things, this has involved the referral of 
constitutional powers held by state governments to the Federal government.   
The success of these reforms was possible only because of the existence of transferable water right systems 
maintained by user-oriented public agencies with effective regulatory capabilities and a high level of 
commitment from the federal and all state governments.  
Source: Saleth and Dinar (2004); Young (pers. comm. 2010). 
 
Although market-based approaches can be used, effective governance at this level requires 
some form of centralized system at the national level.  Such system can be still more 
effective, if transparency and participation are added.  Based on a review of reform 
experienced in several countries, Saleth and Dinar (2006) have developed few stylized facts 
as to the nature and characteristics of the ongoing water governance reforms process at the 
global level.  First, although factors endogenous to water sector (e.g. scarcity, cost recovery, 
and salinity) remain an underlying force, the immediate trigger for reform comes mainly 
from exogenous factors (e.g. macro economic crisis and political reforms).  Second, while 
countries including Chile, Mexico, and South Africa have successfully exploited the 
strategic context set by exogenous factors, this happened more by coincidence than by 
design.  Third, there are fundamental links between the induced changes caused by formal 
reforms at the macro level and the autonomous changes occurring at the micro level.  
Fourth, impromptu approaches to reform dictated by political and financial expediencies can 
be counterproductive especially when the processes used are not thought through 
sufficiently well and can be therefore criticised by those opposed to the reforms.  Fifth, in 
politically and fiscally constraining conditions, the best strategy is to have selective but 
sequentially linked reforms focused on institutional components, regions, and sectors with 
better prospects and quicker benefits.  Finally, besides the country-specific reforms, there 
are also notable instances of transnational governance not only in trans-boundary river 
contexts but also in the context of a whole economic region such as the European Union 
(see Box 7.5). 
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Box 7.5: Water framework directive: A case of international water governance 
Introduced in 2000, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) of the European Union represents the primary 
water policy legislation in the European Union.  It aims to achieve effective water governance at the European 
Union level, including a coherent and effective legal and institutional framework, water-pricing policies, 
public participation and an integrated water resources management system.  The key component of the WFD 
are: (a) protecting all waters, surface and ground waters in a holistic way, (b) good quality (“good status”) to 
be achieved by 2015, (c) integrated water management based on river basins, including the development basin 
plans, (d) combined approach of emission controls and water quality standards, plus phasing out of particularly 
hazardous pesticides, (e) use of economic instruments such as economic analysis and getting the prices right, 
and (f) participation of citizens and stakeholders involved 
Sources: Barreira (2006).   
 
 
7.6 Effectiveness water governance: principles and guidelines 
The effectiveness of water governance arrangements has two complementary dimensions.  
During the design stage a specific mode of organization should be selected.  Following 
completion of the project, conditions of implementation and enforcement of the selected 
arrangement must be assessed on a regular basis.  Most of the theoretical literature and too 
many actual reforms of water governance have focused on the first dimension designing 
optimal contracts or focusing on the technical requirements.  However, we argue that post 
implementation conditions matter as much and that their benign neglect often derails well-
intentioned reforms. 
7.6.1 How to select a governance arrangement?  
The identification of the appropriate governance arrangements during the design stage 
requires a demarcation of different water-related activities such as planning, allocation, use 
and management.  While governance elements with centralized features are required at the 
planning level as well as in the protection of water quality and environment, market or 
negotiation-based mechanism are ideal at the allocation level. 
At this point, it is important to remind decision-makers that the choice of an arrangement is 
largely determined by institutional constraints.  Conditions of embeddedness should 
therefore be considered closely.  To illustrate, it might be desirable to consider major private 
sector participation for efficiency reasons or because of the financial constraints that a 
public authority faces; but an approach can encounter new problems such as a lack of 
institutional arrangements sufficient to protect investors.  Private investors do not want to 
assume investment risks of this kind and, hence, when a tender is called there may only be 
one or even no bids. 
At the most general level, there are four questions that must be satisfied before the domain 
of feasible governance arrangements can be identified.  
1) Do we find an institutional environment, particularly when it comes to political 
guarantees, well designed regulation, and a performing judiciary that can provide 
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adequate support to alternative solutions?  Note that this remains true even when a 
public entity is the preferred arrangement. 
2) Water governance usually involves multiple principal agents (different ministries, 
different levels of government, different agencies, etc.).  Is the institutional 
environment able to coordinate adequately these principal agents, able to simplify 
the decision process, and able to implement the choices that have been made?  
3) Are there dispute resolution mechanisms that can efficiently arbitrate among the 
conflicting interests of the different stakeholders and enforce decisions made?  
4) Last but not least, are the conditions judged by the parties involved as credible (e.g.  
between public authorities and private operators)? There are now institutional 
indicators provided by different organizations (The World Bank, Transparency 
International, Institutional Profiles Database, etc.) that can help to establish a 
relevant check list. 
 
Box 7.6: Credible commitment and the problem of multiple principle agents 
A major reform was initiated in Metropolitan Manila in 1996.  The water system then run by a public 
operator was split in two zones (Manila Eastern zone and Manila Western zone) in order to facilitate 
benchmarking.  Two concessions were awarded (Maynilad in the Western zone, Manila Water in the 
Eastern zone).  The implementation of the contracts faced major difficulties from the very beginning.  
Analyses of these difficulties focused essentially on the impact of the Asian financial crisis.  However, 
there is another dimension, of an institutional nature, that also played an important role, e.g.  in adjusting 
tariffs etc.  Based on two detailed empirical studies, we identified up to 32 principals (ministries, city hall, 
agencies, bureaus ...), often conflicting and simultaneously interfering with the regulator as well as with 
the two operators.  This subverted commitments from public authorities and made adjustments for 
operators chaotic and unpredictable.   
Sources: Castalia (2005), Wu and Malaluan (2008) 
At a more specific level, the search for effective modes of governance must take into 
account constraints imposed by the characteristics of the water sector and of its subsectors.  
First, there are technical constraints that delineate the domain of possible solutions.  
Building a dam in order to provide water to the city or to farmers, for instance, imposes a 
centralized approach that differs from the possibilities an extended underground reservoir 
offers.  Second, financial resources and their appropriateness to financial needs are also 
determining factors.  The existence of a local or regional active financial market or the 
political credibility that makes foreign investments attractive might make effective a 
solution that involves private sector participation, which would otherwise be impossible or 
very limited.  Third, there is the very sensitive problem in the water sector of social 
acceptability.  There are two main issues at stake here, one that concerns users’ participation 
in the very early stages of the decision process, the other that has to do with the 
consequences of solutions considered, particularly with respect to pricing. 
A final issue to be taken into account, in the selection of a specific mode of governance, is 
the conditions under which the selected solution is actually played out.  For example, let us 
assume that a contractual solution, e.g. a lease or concession, has been chosen as the most 
adequate solution for reforming and extending an urban water system and that it is decided 
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to proceed through open tenders to all interested operators.  Let us also assume that there are 
several potential candidates, (which is often not the case in the water sector).  We know 
both from experience and from the theory that there are different ways of organizing 
selection among bidders, e.g. selecting the best offer (which creates a bias described as “the 
winner’s cursor”, according to which some candidates overestimate potential gains and 
overshoot their offer in order to win) versus selecting second or even third rank bidders.  
Alternatively, a first round of open tenders may be followed by a second round of 
negotiations with operators who exhibited the most promising potential at first, a solution 
that involves high risks (of collusion and or of corruption) but also allows defining a better 
fitted solution when complex issues and or missing information are at stake. 
It should be emphasized here that all these solutions involve significant transaction costs.  In 
the trade-offs among alternative modes of governance, which go far beyond the initial trade-
off between public and private solutions, these costs are too often neglected by international 
donors and decision makers.  To put it bluntly, complex arrangements may not make sense 
because they are too costly to monitor and or because the required expertise is not available 
and or because it becomes too obscure to users. 
7.6.2 Conditions of effectiveness in implementing new water governance 
The difficulty is that many of these problems are revealed only after the new governance 
regime has been implemented.  Therefore, the effectiveness of selected water governance 
should also incorporate the conditions of implementation and enforcement of the solution 
selected.  The accumulated experience of the last two decades suggests that at the 
management level, especially at the local level which is central in the water sector, user and 
community-based systems are more effective than the bureaucratic ones that are currently 
operating.  Similarly, basin-based and stakeholder-oriented systems of governance will be 
more effective than administrative unit-based systems.  In that respect, two series of 
conditions to success should be emphasised.  These are often neglected or underestimated in 
the approach to water governance. 
First, decision-makers as well as theoreticians have become increasingly aware of the key 
role of institutions.  However, they have mostly focused on the general institutional 
environment, for instance, the implementation of adequate laws and regulations at the 
national level and the creation of central regulatory agencies.   When it comes to water 
governance, whether in an urban environment or in relation to irrigation, we would argue 
that micro institutions implemented at the local and/or regional level matter at least as much 
as the global ones and play a decisive role in making new governance sustainable.  Among 
these micro institutions, the role of regulatory bodies embedded in local and or regional 
governments is worth noting, since they are directly in charge of designing the agreements 
(and or the conditions of their implementation) and in monitoring the arrangement.  Basin 
agencies are good examples of the significance of these micro institutions in the water 
sector.  Important functions of these bodies concern the information they can collect on 
alternative solutions implemented elsewhere and the way this information is used to 
establish benchmark indicators of performance. The other function concerns the 
mechanisms of control and sanctions they can activate.  In that respect, an active role for 
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users and adequate modalities of this participation in order to avoid capture by specific 
groups of interest, are key issues. 
Second, human capital makes the difference.7 This is a much under estimated component of 
effectiveness.  Building adequate human assets often makes the difference, as so many 
reforms in the governance of water illustrates, whether it is through a public entity, as 
illustrated by the urban water system in Phnom-Penh (see Araral, 2009; and Marin 2009), or 
with private sector participation, as with the Société de Distribution d’Eau de la Côte 
d’Ivoire (SODECI) in Abidjan (Ménard and Clarke 2002).  Four conditions particularly 
matter here:  
(1) adequate training for all personnel, particularly the management; 
(2) well aligned incentives, so that the entire personnel benefits from improved 
performance and motivation to pursue results; 
(3) delegating responsibilities at the local level so that there is more room for 
management to interact  with community representatives and  develop local solutions; 
(4) promoting leadership, since successful reforms all substantiate the key role of a 
leader or a leading team capable of convincing the decision-makers and stakeholders of the 
necessity to radically reform or improve water governance and capable of implementing 
changes needed. 
 
Box 7.7: The role of human capital: the case of Phnom Penh 
The reform of the public utility in charge of water and sanitation in Phnom Penh is considered a success 
story.  Its causes were summarized as follows: “To achieve this, the concerned governments have had to 
make choices.  These include putting in place sound tariff policies, refraining from interference in 
operations, and putting in place professional management that is held accountable for results.”  (Marin, 
2009, p. 146).  However, this last factor is left undeveloped in this review and is ignored in too many 
reports and case studies.  In the case of Phnom Penh, building adequate human assets was a key to 
success.  It involved two dimensions: an intensive training program for all the staff, and the existence of 
a strong leadership that could provide internal cohesion and dynamism and simultaneously convince 
political leaders of the value of choices made and maintain their stamina in that respect.  Triche, 
Requena and Kariuki (2006) rightly emphasized the key role of training, consultation and promotional 
activities, including communities’ involvement, at the time of reform in Cambodia.  But they also 
identified the lack of training and support in the long run, when difficulties in implementing contracts 
emerged.  This is where a motivated staff and a strong leadership become really central, as illustrated by 
the case of Phnom Penh. 
Source:  (Araral, 2009) 
 
The many elements outlined above that are required for an effective governance of the water 
sector exhibit the difficulty of selecting a particular governance arrangement that can fit all 
contexts.  A mix of governance systems—both state, market, and user and or community-
based ones—are needed to achieve the efficiency, equity, and sustainability goals within the 
                                                 
7
 For instructive  discussions and data on this issue, see the series of reports for ILO on “Social Dialogue” in 
the reform of water and sanitation (e.g., Fajana 2008, on Nigeria; and Masanjala 2009, on Malawi) 
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irrigation sector.  Choosing the right mode of organization for the right project requires 
taking into account these different dimensions and weighting them accordingly.  Our 
analysis provides a framework that must be followed according to the context, in order to 
guarantee that solutions adopted are properly aligned with technical and/or physical 
requirements, organizational capacities and the institutional environment.  Appropriate 
alignment is the key to success. 
 
7.7 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
As far as the effectiveness of alternative water governance arrangements both at the sub 
sectoral and at the sectoral level is concerned, there is no silver bullet that fits all conditions 
and requirements.  A more realistic approach is to promote different governance forms to 
suit different contexts, a mix of such systems may be the best solution.  For effective water 
governance, neither state-centric nor market-centric governance are going to be of much 
help.  Co-operative relationships between various institutions, representing complementary 
logics and functions will provide a more durable solution (Blatter and Ingram 2000).  This 
clearly suggests the need for a comparative approach in building local and or regional 
institutions that can fit well the requirements of the urban water utilities and irrigation 
sector.  There is no foolproof water governance arrangement but some arrangements are 
relatively more effective than other alternatives in specific contexts.  Suitability of 
governance arrangements depends on specific contexts.  Some are good for efficiency while 
others are good for equity.  Similarly, for some functions such as planning and water 
quality, centralized forms may be better for scale-economy and technical considerations, but 
for others such as allocation and management, more decentralized and market or 
negotiation-based arrangements are better in terms of flexibility. 
From the perspective of both urban water supply and the irrigation sector, the identification 
of the appropriate governance arrangements requires a demarcation of different water-
related activities such as planning, allocation, use and management.  This is also applicable 
to the governance question at the water sector as a whole.  While governance elements with 
centralized features are required at the planning level as well as in the protection of water 
quality and environment, market or negotiation-based mechanisms are ideal at the allocation 
level.  At the management level, especially at the local level user, community-based systems 
are more effective than the bureaucratic ones that are operating at present.  Similarly, basin-
based and stakeholder-orientated systems of governance will be more effective than 
administrative unit-based systems.  As a result, it is difficult to select a particular 
governance arrangement that can fit all contexts.  A mix of governance systems—both state, 
market, and user and or community-based ones—are needed to achieve the efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability goals within the irrigation sector.  However, we have identified 
three key issues:  
(a) feasibility on the supply side depends on the appropriate alignment between 
technical conditions, organizational possibilities, and institutional frame; 
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(b) acceptability on the demand side depends on users’ perception and needs as well as 
the capacity for operators and public authorities to implement and maintain open 
channels of communication; and 
(c) the need for capacity building and technical upgrading of the organizations involved 
in water management. 
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7.9  Acronyms 
IMT  Irrigation Management Transfer 
IWRM  Integrated Water Resource Management 
PSP Private Sector Participation 
RBO  River Basin Organisations 
SODECI  Société de Distribution d’Eau de la Côte d’Ivoire 
SOE State Owned Enterprise 
WFD  Water Framework Directive 
 
